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Abstract: The 51% attack is a technique which intends to fork a blockchain in order to conduct
double-spending. Adversaries controlling more than half of the total hashing power of a network can
perform this attack. In a similar way, n confirmation and selfish mining are two attack techniques
that comprise a similar strategy to the 51% attack. Due to the immense attacking cost to perform the
51% attack, it was considered very unlikely for a long period. However, in recent times, the attack
has befallen at a frequent pace, costing millions of dollars to various cryptocurrencies. The 51% attack
strategy varies based upon the adopted consensus mechanism by a particular cryptocurrency, and
it enables attackers to double-spend the same crypto-coin, restrict transactions, cancel blocks, and
even have full control over the price of a cryptocurrency. A crypto-coin with a low hashing power is
always jeopardized by the 51% attack due to the easily attainable hashing. In this paper, we analyze
the real impact of the 51% attack, revealing serious weaknesses in consensus protocols that made
this attack possible. We discuss the five most advanced protection techniques to prevent this attack
and their main limitations. We conclude that in most cases, security techniques fail to provide real
protection against the 51% attack because the weaknesses are inherited from the consensus protocols.
Keywords: 51% attack; double-spending; security techniques; consensus mechanism
1. Introduction
Blockchain is an emerging technology that allows performing digital transactions within a short
period [1]. It is a secure medium which works by sharing information over the peer-to-peer (P2P)
network. A piece of shared information to a single entity reaches all participants within the network,
without the data being tampered. In addition to crypto-transactions, it is also leveraged for various
other purposes, such as insuring intellectual property, generating financial contracts, tracing food
production, and tracking supply chains [2]. The rise of this technology has been obstructed from time
to time by various pernicious attacks. Attacks such as the Sybil attack, Eclipse attack, border gateway
protocol (BGP) hijacking, and 51% attack originated from an attempt to strike the blockchain network.
Amongst these, the 51% attack has been neglected by security researchers mainly due to the immense
attacking cost. However, recent attacks have proven that the 51% attacks can be performed on various
modern cryptocurrencies. The proof-of-work (PoW) consensus protocol is an immediate threat of the
51% attack compared to other consensus protocols. Recent attacks were mainly targeting crypto-coins
that rely on PoW.
Bitcoin is the first cryptocurrency which was implemented in the blockchain network [3]. It is
based on the PoW consensus protocol, and several cryptocurrencies inherited the consensus rules.
After Bitcoin appeared, new cryptocurrencies evolved to take advantage of the blockchain network.
The more this technology was adapted, the more it drew the attention of potential attackers.
The low hashing coins are more prone to this attack technique due to the gigantic costs on high
hashing coins. As a result, the recent attacks were mostly targeting low hashing coins, such as Bitcoin
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Gold (BTG), Verge (XVG) and Ethereum Classic (ETC). The dangerous part of a 51% attack is that
there is no way to detect it until it is fully executed; hence, when an adversary is in possession of the
required hashing power, the chances of success can be close to 100%.
In summary, the major contributions in this paper are:
• We discuss seven major security threats that jeopardize the blockchain network;
• We reveal the limitations of the consensus mechanisms by classifying them in several attacks;
• We define the majority hash rate problem and point out the consequences of the attack techniques;
• We analyze five security protection mechanisms specific to the 51% attack and demonstrate their
limitations against the 51% attack exploitation.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 is the background section, which defines the concept
behind blockchain technology. Section 3 illustrates seven attacks which can affect the blockchain
network significantly. Section 4 discusses the three widely adopted consensus protocols and their
limitations. This section also classifies the consensus based on various attacks. Section 5 discusses the
majority hash rate problem in depth and points out the major consequences of this attack. In Section 6,
we present the defense mechanisms to mitigate the 51% attack. Section 7 involves our analysis of the
defense mechanisms to determine their robustness against the 51% attack. Finally, we conclude the
paper in Section 8, pointing out the main weaknesses which suggest new modifications to the existing
consensus protocols.
2. Background
To understand the significant contributions of this paper, it is necessary to elaborate on the
consensus mechanism and blockchain technology in depth. This section enhances the quality of
experience (QoE) of the blockchain network as well as discusses the mining and hashing context.
2.1. Blockchain Technology: The Digital Concept
Blockchain technology consists of records of data which are referred to as a ledger. It employs
a distributed system for the verification of records. Blocks are verified by thousands of network
participants around the globe to keep the network active. Here we discuss the full concept behind
blockchain technology.
2.1.1. Consensus Mechanism
A consensus mechanism is a protocol which is in place to ensure that all the participants in
the blockchain network are complying with the agreed rules [4]. It ensures that the transactions
emerge from a legitimate source by having every participant consent to the state of the distributed
ledger. The public blockchain is a decentralized technology, and no centralized authority is in
place to regulate the required act. Therefore, the network requires authorizations from the network
participants for the verification and authentication of any activities that occur in the blockchain
network. The whole process is done based on the consensus of the network participants, and it makes
the blockchain a trustless, secure, and reliable technology for digital transactions. Distinct consensus
mechanisms follow different principles, which enables the network participants to comply with those
rules. Several consensus mechanisms have been introduced considering the requirements of secure
digital transactions. However, proof of work (PoW), proof of stake (PoS), and delegated proof of stake
(DPoS) are the few consensus protocols used by the main cryptocurrencies.
2.1.2. Blockchain Functionality
Blockchain is a digital technology which stores digital information [5] in blocks. Each block
is chained to the blocks adjacent to it, called a blockchain. Any information inside the blocks can
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never be changed due to the immutable feature. Altering a single piece of information of a block
invalidates every block after the one that was altered. The block information is available publicly,
and one can easily track almost all key information, such as client records, property contracts, and
payment information. Every block comprises a digital signature which correlates with the strings in
that particular block. The whole process occurs through a hashing procedure, and a change to a single
digit of the block string produces an entirely new digital signature. The blockchain blocks are available
for verification by anyone who is part of the network. As a result, any malicious alterations can be
immediately detected by the network participants. Regardless of the failure of any part of the network,
the blockchain network still keeps running as normal. A block in the bitcoin blockchain typically has a
size of 1 MB, and it can contain many transactions as long as it is within the size limit.
Figure 1 presents a full layout of a bitcoin blockchain block. The block header size is 80 bytes,
which includes the version, previous hash, Merkle hash, timestamp, difficulty level, and the nonce. All
the information is then hashed to include the inside of the next block header.
Figure 1. The layout of a bitcoin block. The block number contains a 4-byte arbitrary number confirming
it as a bitcoin block, and the block size ensures the size of the block. A block header layout shows its
contents. The block header is hashed using SHA-256 and the hash value to be added to the “previous
hash” section of the next block header. The transaction counter counts the total number of transactions,
and the transaction list contains the list of all transactions added to the block.
2.1.3. Hashing and Digital Signatures
A digital signature is a mechanism that is used to validate the accuracy and integrity of a data
string [6]. Every block comprises one unique digital signature based on the strings that the block
contains. Figure 2 presents a partial view of 3 blocks that are chained to each other. Each block
produces a digital signature which is generated considering the contents, such as Merkle hash and the
digital signature of previous blocks. A digital signature does not always qualify to validate the next
block, as the bitcoin blockchain sets a level of difficulty to determine the block creation time. Hence,
having fewer transactions in a block does not necessarily help to create a block faster than the other
nodes. If the difficulty level requires having 17 zeros in front of the digital signature, then the miners
require meeting that condition to validate a block. An attacker making modifications to the data string
changes the digital signature and will fail to meet the requirement for the next blocks that are chained
to it [7]. To overcome the scenario, a new signature must be generated for every subsequent block
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on the chain. The process becomes very costly and nearly impossible, as the attacker is required to
generate new signatures not only for the blocks which have been corrupted but also any blocks that
are being added on a regular interval.
Figure 2. A partial layout of bitcoin blocks, where each block is chained to each other. Tx1, TX2, and
TX3 are hashed through the Merkle tree process. The Merkle hash adds a nonce value sequentially to
generate a new Hash and then compare it to the difficulty level. The entire data string produces a hash
value, which is then added to the next block by forming a chain of blocks.
2.1.4. Blockchain Mining
Blockchain mining is a process which involves computing a new block to be added to the
distributed ledger [8]. The mining is mainly correlated to bitcoin, as the block generation process
differs on distinct cryptocurrencies. Mining computers are often powerful machines that are used
in generating the correct hash values. Nodes that are involved with mining are required to solve
a mathematical puzzle utilizing their machines to mine. As soon as a miner successfully produces
a new block, the miner notifies the network about it. Every miner in the network stops mining that
block and again restarts solving equations for the next block. In the mining process, a miner takes
the hash Merkle root and adds it to the nonce value. A new hash is generated from the alteration of
the nonce and then compared with the target each time. If the hash value is less than the target, the
mathematical puzzle is solved. However, while the hash value is higher than the target, the nonce
value needs to be changed and matched with the target value until the conditions are met. A mining
pool involves hundreds of thousands of mining machines. Therefore, a pool usually comprises more
hashing power than other miners and has the advantage to find the required hash faster than other
miners [9]. The mining time of bitcoin is about 10 min, requiring extensive hardware for the process.
Currently, miners receive a mining reward of 12.5 BTC for every successful block they generate and
also the fees associated with each transaction. The reward reduces to half about every four years.
In this section, we presented the full overview of the blockchain technology. This technology is at
a high risk and has been exploited by various attacks in recent time. Therefore, in the next section, we
present various security threats to reveal their attacking strategies on the blockchain network.
3. Security Threats
In this section, we discuss the seven main security threats to blockchain technology. When those
attacks are successfully executed, they result in the loss of large amounts of money or cause a denial of
service to some blockchain nodes.
3.1. 51% Attack
The 51% attack is a technique that occurs when an attacker is in possession of 51% of the hashing
power. This attack starts by creating a chain of blocks privately, which is fully isolated from the real
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version of the chain. At a later stage, the isolated chain is presented to the network to be established as
a genuine chain. This is what enables the double-spending attack [10]. Since the blockchain policy
complies with the longest chain rule [11], if attackers are able to get 51% of the hashing power or more,
they will be in a position to drive the longest chain by persuading the network nodes to follow their
chain. However, it is not strictly necessary to obtain 51% of the hashing power; if attackers get less than
half of the hashing power [12], the double-spending attack is still possible but with less probability of
success. The more hashing power the entire blockchain network comprises, the more costly the attack
becomes. Thus, cryptocurrencies with high network hashing are assumed to be more secure against
the 51% attack.
3.2. Long-Range Attack
A Long-range attack is a technique that appears due to the weak subjectivity model [13]. This
attack technique comprises a similar approach to the 51% attack. However, instead of beating the 6
block confirmation, it tends to fork the chain from the genesis block [14]. The likelihood of this attack
is nearly non-existent in bitcoin, but it can be destructive to proof of stake (PoS) and delegated proof of
stake (DPoS) consensus. Considering a scenario at PoS consensus, where some attackers start with a
limited number of coins soon after the Genesis block, they can privately mine their version of chain to
conduct the attack. Though considering their limited stake, they are allowed to produce limited blocks
at the beginning, through the process, they will be permitted to generate a longer chain. Since PoS
does not define a limit on the augmentation of the chain, the chain can extend very long.
3.3. Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS)
Distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) is a type of cyber attack which is used to make resources
unavailable to network participants by flooding with extreme traffic [15] in a distributed way. This
attack has been carried out in the past two decades to cause damage to various networks [16]. Research
indicates that the impact of DDoS is rising and costs more than $2 Million to enterprises on average on
each attack [17]. DDoS is one of the most common attacks in the blockchain network used by attackers
to obstruct authentic transactions so that invalid transactions can be executed. However, due to the
decentralized nature of blockchain, DDoS can mitigate network activity only to a certain level.
3.4. P+ Epsilon Attack
The P + epsilon attack is a technique which leverages the dominant strategy of network
participants. PoW-based blockchain is usually vulnerable to this type of attack [18]. In a scenario where
attackers offer a payout to participants in order to gain an advantage, a payoff matrix is applied where
the dominant strategy assists in order to succeed with the attacking goal. After the attack, nothing is
paid to the participants, and the attacker gains all the profit. It is a simple statistical observation based
on the uncoordinated choice model.
3.5. Sybil Attack
The Sybil attack aims to corrupt a P2P network by forming several fake identities [19]. The attack
method was first brought to the world’s attention by John Douceur [20], a researcher based at Microsoft.
The attackers can establish several fake nodes that appear to be genuine to their peers. These fake
nodes take part in corrupting the network to validate unauthorized transactions and to alter valid
transactions. They can use several devices, virtual machines or internet protocol (IP) addresses as
fake nodes for the attack. The P2P network assumes that each participating node comprises only one
identity. Therefore, several fake nodes give attackers the capability to deny transmitted blocks [21]
and to outvote honest nodes. When an adversary owns a large number of network nodes, it enhances
the chances of double-spending. However, there is a large number of nodes in the bitcoin blockchain
network resulting in a very expensive attack.
Appl. Sci. 2019, 9, 1788 6 of 17
3.6. The Balance Attack
The balance attack is a technique which targets the nodes that comprise balanced mining
power [22]. This attack can be executed to double-spend on PoW consensus. An attacker can utilize
their limited hashing power to delay messages over the Ethereum blockchain. Only 5% of the total
hashing power can be enough to carry out this attack. A delay is first introduced between the licit
subgroups of nodes. The attacker then mines a vast amount of blocks to another subgroup, ensuring
that the other subtree puts importance on the transaction subgroups. The ghost protocol is exploited
by separating the blockchain branch from the other nodes in the network. Subsequently, the separated
branch is produced to other nodes to have an impact over the branch selection process.
3.7. Border Gateway Protocol Hijacking (BGP)
Border gateway protocol (BGP) hijacking, also known as a routing attack, is a technique where the
internet service provider (ISP) makes false announcements over the routing system to divert traffic [23].
There are two attack scenarios that can be leveraged by an attacker. The first one is to partition the
bitcoin network to hijack IP prefixes, and the second one consists of obstructing the block propagation
by 20 min. The possible consequence of this attack is the ability to perform the double-spending attack.
Moreover, the exchanges and pools can also be prevented from conducting regular transactions. BGP
attacks are being carried out at a large scale over the Bitcoin network, and at least 100 BGP exploitation
occurs on a monthly basis [24]. Though the blockchain system is a decentralized network, from a
routing perspective, it can be regarded as centralized as about 100 IP prefixes are managing about 20%
of the bitcoin hosts.
The presented attack vectors can cause a severe effect over the blockchain network. An important
limitation has been found in the consensus mechanisms. Therefore, it is essential to analyze them in
order to reveal the weaknesses that can result in attacks targeting digital transactions.
4. Consensus Mechanism Weaknesses
In this section, we discuss three widely adopted consensus mechanisms and their weaknesses.
Table 1 shows the main features of the consensus mechanisms and Table 2 categorizes each
consensus towards the attacks discussed in Section 2. Our analysis indicates that the consensus
mechanisms comprise severe limitations, resulting in a low quality of experience (QoE) of the network
participants [25]. The analysis is constructed assessing various security experiments and reviewing
attack methods based on particular consensus mechanisms.
Table 1. Main features of consensus mechanisms.
Consensus Energy Cost Decentralization Processing Speed
PoW High High Low
PoS Low High High
DPoS Low Low High
Table 2. Consensus mechanisms that are vulnerable to various attacks.
Consensus 51% Long Range DDoS P+Epsilon Sybil Balance BGP
Mechanisms Attack Attack Attack Attack Attack Attack Hijacking
PoW 3 7 3 3 3 3 3
PoS 3 3 3 7 3 7 7
DPoS 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
4.1. Proof of Work (PoW)
Proof of work (PoW) is a consensus mechanism that is based on solving a mathematical
equation. PoW was first initiated by bitcoin, and then it was rapidly implemented by many major
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cryptocurrencies [26]. Miners are the main pillar of PoW consensus, and the process of authorizing
and recording the transaction is approved by the miners. PoW consensus requires the miners to put
a considerable amount of effort to mine a block. The process involves a random method of attempting
answers on a trial and error basis. Hence, it may take one or even thousands of attempts to solve the
equation. In order for the “target hash” to be recognized, it must contain a lower number than the
hash of the block [27].
PoW consensus assumes that half of the network nodes are always honest miners; hence, obtaining
more than half the hashing power makes this consensus vulnerable. One of the significant drawbacks of
PoW is the cost of energy and hardware requirement. Research has shown that the amount of electricity
consumption of the bitcoin mining process is a lot more than 159 countries [28]. However, the mining
requirement and mining time may vary due to the algorithms used by individual cryptocurrencies.
The mining process of PoW is comparatively slow compared to that of other consensus protocols.
Since a few mining pools dominate with a large amount of mining power, attacks to those pools can
cause severe disruptions to the bitcoin network. Recent attacks proved that PoW is vulnerable to the
51% attack. Low hashing crypto-coins utilizing PoW consensus are more vulnerable to 51% attack, as
the required hash can be acquired easily. Thr P + epsilon attack can be executed at no cost while in
possession of the required budget [29].
In our analysis, we indicate that the Sybil attack can successfully exploit the PoW by forming
a large number of malicious nodes. The Ethereum protocol and private blockchains are vulnerable to
the balance attack [22,30]. Moreover, the DDoS attack and BGP hijacking can also be used to interrupt
the regular stream of this consensus mechanism [23]. AntPool, BW.com, NiceHash, CKPool, and
GHash.io are a few mining pools which have already been hit by DDoS attacks [31].
4.2. Proof of Stake (PoS)
Proof of stake (PoS) is a consensus mechanism which authorizes blocks based on the stakes
a participant pours into the network. Miners in possession of a large number of coins possess more
power than other participants [32]. Peercoin was the first cryptocurrency to use this consensus in
2012. A randomized process is followed to consider the creator of the next block. The process involves
obtaining the detail about the total amount of the cryptocurrency, and also the duration for which it
has been maintained. The advantage of PoS consensus is that it does not require participants to go
through an expensive mining process such as PoW.
PoS is vulnerable due to its centralized attributes [33]. While staking a large portion of wealth
consistently, a participant becomes a powerful entity within the network and also able to influence the
well-being of the network. By achieving the majority of the supply, a malicious stakeholder can take
advantage of the nothing-at-stake problem. PoS suffers from weak subjectivity, and the implementation
process is also very complex and challenging [34]. To conduct a 51% attack, an adversary is required
to achieve the 51% of the distinct cryptocurrency. However, the cost of achieving 51% of the total
stake can be immense. Therefore, the threat level of the 51% attack can be low compared to PoW. Our
study reveals that PoS can be exploited by the long-range attack [13]. The P + epsilon attack cannot be
executed since an attacker needs to achieve a large budget to contribute as a security deposit for the
participants while voting for the minority [29]. PoS can be exploited by a Sybil attack, and a DDoS
attack can also disrupt part of the network.
4.3. Delegated Proof of Stake (DPoS)
Delegated proof of stake (DPoS) is a consensus mechanism that permits shareholders to vote for
witnesses [35]. The main idea of DPoS is to reduce the wastage of energy and enhance the speed of
transactions. The overall block generation process makes this consensus mechanism many times faster
than the PoW consensus. DPoS comprises a one vote per share policy, which gives the stakeholders the
option to cast more votes while they possess more coins. The witnesses are rewarded for generating
blocks, but they are also penalized when they fail to perform the required task, resulting in them being
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unpaid and voted out. Witnesses must acquire the largest number of votes from random stakeholders
in order to perform the instructed task. The stakeholders also vote for the delegates to reform and
make changes in the network, which are reviewed for an ultimate decision.
DPoS was developed to bring up efficiency in transactions and overcome the limitations
introduced by various other consensus mechanisms; however, it includes severe flaws. It fails to
achieve adequate decentralization, and the network slows down due to the vast number of validators.
Due to the centralized aspects, it can be a focal point of random attackers. DPoS is vulnerable to the
51% attack. The attacker can convince the stakeholders to obtain 51% voting power to execute a 51%
attack [36]. This consensus mechanism is also vulnerable to other primary attacks, such as a long-range
attack, DDoS attack, P + epsilon attack, Sybil attack, and the balance attack.
In the presented study, we pointed out that the three major consensus algorithms have significant
limitations and are vulnerable to various attacks. The weakness in the consensus makes the digital
transactions at a high risk of potential attacks. Table 2 presents our evaluation summary. It is worth
noting that all three consensus mechanisms can be exploited by the 51% attack, making this attack
very attractive for attackers, especially for the PoW, where obtaining the necessary hashing power is
less costly.
5. The Majority Hash Rate Problem
An attacker in possession of a great amount of hashing power can cause a serious impact over
a blockchain network. The 51% attack occurs due to the majority hash and can be devastating in
the blockchain network [37]. It is very important to reveal the nature and possible sequel to the
exploitation. This section involves discussing majority hash attacks and also presents the consequences
by illustrating the double-spending issue and risks of mining centralization. Figure 3 presents eight
major cryptocurrencies which have been affected from the 51% attack [38], and Figure 4 demonstrates
the stages of a 51% attack technique by forking the blockchain.
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Figure 4. A scenario where three blocks are generated at the same block height 2053. Tow blocks
became orphaned as the network chose to follow the block in the middle. Blocks 2065 to 2074 are
privately mined blocks, which resulted in canceling transactions on the legit Block 2066. The network
follows blocks from 2065 to 2074, broadcasted by the attacker, due to the longest chain.
5.1. The Majority Hash Attacks
The majority hash attacks have been a serious problem in recent times. A miner possessing a large
amount of hashing power can influence the network to perform malicious activities. The 51% attack,
selfish mining, and 34% attack can occur when an attacker achieves a large amount of hashing power.
The 51% attack requires an attacker to hold more than half of the hashing power [39]. A 51% attack
against cryptocurrencies enables attackers to perform malicious actions, including double-spending,
controlling market price or ruling over the mining strategy. We have selected the main eight
crypto-coins that have been exploited most recently. Figure 3 presents the amount of losses encountered
due to the 51% exploitation from April 2018 to January 2019. Verge (XVG) has been attacked twice in
consecutive months losing $1.1 million and $1.75 million, followed by bitcoin gold (BTG), which is
the most affected coin, losing around $18 Million. The rest of the coins also lost a significant amount
from exploitation. The total loss makes an average amount of $2.5 Million per attack on individual
currencies.
Selfish mining is another majority hash attack which is accomplished with approximately 25%
of the total network hashing [40,41]. It can be carried out by miners or mining pools which comprise
a large amount of network hash. In this attack technique, the miners become very selective in
broadcasting their blocks to the network. They can decide either to discard their blocks by giving up
their reward or to broadcast several blocks at once. This will cancel other miners’ blocks, making them
losie their reward as well as the transaction fees. During the process, independent nodes intend to join
the attacker to increase their profits, and attackers gain more control over the network by having more
hashing power.
Another attack is the 34% attack. This attack occurs due to a majority of network hashing. IOTA
is a cryptocurrency developed for the Internet of Things. The IOTA is not based on blockchain and
comprises unique storage known as Tangle [42]. Tangle is also a distributed ledger performing similar
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operations as the blockchain. IOTA comprises a centralized feature and us also vulnerable to 34%
attack [43].
5.2. The Double-Spending Issue
Double-spending is a technique that is initiated to respend the same currency [44]. A weakness
in the consensus mechanism uplifts the likelihood of a majority hash rate attack, and successful
exploitation leads to double-spending by allowing attackers to cancel transactions and spend the same
coin again. In order to carry out double-spending, attackers first spend their coins in the legit chain.
After that, they start building another chain privately where the attackers’ coins are not spent. Once
the privately mined chain is long, the attackers present the new chain to the network. Since the chain is
longer than the one being used, the new chain will be used by the network as a legit chain discarding
the blocks where attackers spend their coins.
The probability of double-spending on PoW consensus varies depending upon the number of
blocks an adversary is able to generate [12]. However, the more confirmations introduced, the less the
chance of double-spending. If an attacker is in possession of a 10% hash rate, then double-spending is
still possible but with a smaller possibility of success. Various exchanges grant a transaction approval
after six confirmations to mitigate the double-spending issue; nevertheless, attackers with 51% hashing
power can keep building blocks secretly at a faster pace and carry out double-spend regardless of the
number of confirmations set by the exchanges.
5.3. Mining Centralization
Mining centralization is a significant issue in the PoW mining pools due to the dominance of the
hashing power. Mining pools with powerful systems can compute more hashes, having a better chance
of solving problems than others. Individual pools may involve hundreds or thousands of participants
in the mining process being in possession of a large amount of the total network hashing power.
Pools with immense hashing power can collaborate to make the network vulnerable. The seven major
bitcoin mining pools, out of the top 10, are based on China. Hence, the dominating attributes by a few
mining pools have structured the blockchain as a centralized network. Several mining pools were also
attacked by DDoS attacks in the past, obstructing their mining activities and demanding a payment to
discontinue the attack [31].
In July 2014, GHash.io reached more than 50% hashing power, becoming a great threat to Bitcoin
and the exchanges [45]. They were in charge of the majority hashing for nearly 24 h. However, after
breaching the threshold, various participants related to the pool halted their mining power for the sake
of the security of the network. The main cause of reaching the majority of hashing was the combined
hashing. However, at a later time, GHash.io announced not having accumulated 51% hashing. They
agreed to stop accepting distinct mining resources and to implement a feature for participants to mine
from various other pools. The pool stopped its mining operation since 2016.
Figure 5 defines the number of blocks created on 10 March 2019 by only six mining pools in a 24 h
period [46]. A total number of 137 bitcoin blocks were generated, where 92 blocks were produced by
the six mining pools, making it about 67% of the total blocks during that period. The block counts refer
to the total number of blocks generated by a particular mining pool, and continuous block refers to the
number of times a pool was able to generate blocks in a sequence. We present that F2Pool was able to
generate 2 or more blocks on three occasions, whereas BTC.com also produced blocks in sequence 2
times. Antpool and ViaBTC generated blocks in sequence once. BTC.TOP and SlushPool could not
generate a longer chain of blocks.
In recent times, the majority hash rate problem has been a serious issue to cryptocurrencies. The
low hashing coins constitute higher threats of 51% exploitation. Attackers are focused on coins where
the attack cost is minimal to maximize profit. Only a few mitigation techniques have been introduced in
recent times to defend against a 51% attack. In the next section, we discuss those protection techniques
to assess their effectiveness later.
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6. 51% Attack Mitigation Techniques
In this section, we discuss the five most recent defense techniques which are based on mitigating
the 51% attack. We particularly chose these techniques as they are the most advanced and recent
techniques introduced after the recent 51% exploitations.
6.1. A Penalty System for Delayed Block Submission
A penalty system for delayed block submission is a security proposal by Horizen [47]. The
proposal suggests modifying Satoshi consensus to secure a network against the 51% attack. The
penalty system proposes increasing the attacking cost extensively so that the potential advantage
cannot be achieved towards exploitation. A penalty is applied considering the amount of time a block
is hidden from the blockchain network. The time is calculated based on the interval duration between
blocks. This security protection technique notifies the entire network about the continuous fork, and
during that period, the participants, miners, and exchanges are restricted from performing fraudulent
transactions until the delay is lifted. This defense mechanism primarily focuses on a privately mined
chain and does not pay attention if the network suffers from a fork.
The penalty system follows Equation (1), a quadratic function which determines the level of
penalty to be imposed. For example, assuming a genuine chain containing blocks from 553 to 558, and
there is an attacker that managed to produce blocks from 553 to 559, then the penalty will be computed
considering the first block height introduced by the attacker. That is, the n value in Equation (1) is
calculated subtracting 553 from 558, obtaining 15 as a penalty delay.
DelayBlock = ∑
n
i=1 n(n+ 1)
2
(1)
6.2. Delayed Proof of Work (dPoW)
Delayed proof of work (dPoW) is a security solution by Komodo. They developed dPoW to
protect against the double-spending problem [48]. This security technique is already being utilized
in about 20 blockchains. It is applicable to cryptocurrencies that are based on an unspent transaction
output (UTXO). The dPoW consensus mechanism utilizes the assigned PoW blockchain to save the
Komodo transactions [33]. Hence, to defend a 51% attack against the Komodo’s blockchain, any
existing copy of the Komodo chain permits the entire chain to take control of malicious activities.
The prime attribute of this security chain is that it does not recognize the longest chain rule. It adds
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a security layer to prevent attackers from performing the 51% attack. However, it also offers to integrate
notary nodes that justify whether the hash is secure for the network. The dPoW deploys 64 special
nodes around the globe, and the nodes get elected every year to perform the desired task.
6.3. PirlGuard
PirlGuard is a security protocol developed to mitigate the 51% attack [49]. It modifies the
consensus algorithm in order to protect against the 51% attack. The PirlGuard protocol is based on
the attributes of Horizen’s penalty protocol, but it is mainly built for Ethash. When an attacker starts
peering with the network by confirming their privately built blocks, PirlGuard abandons the peer
instantly by penalization to mine x number of blocks. The number of penalized blocks is determined
by the number of blocks the adversary manages to mine in secret.
PirlGuard also introduces notary contracts, which are controlled by the master nodes. The main
task of the master nodes includes notarizing the blockchain and penalizing the malicious actors by
retrieving the legit consensus on the Pirl blockchain. The notary contracts are implemented on the Pirl
and Ethereum blockchain.
6.4. ChainLocks
ChainLocks is a security technique developed to secure DASH. It results from the implementation
of long living masternode quorums (LLMQs) to mitigate the 51% attack [50]. ChainLocks executes
a network-wide vote process which comprises a “first-seen” policy. For each particular block, an
LLMQ of a large number of master nodes is approved. It requires every participant to sign the
noticed block so that the active chain can be extended. The majority of the participants, 60% or
more, verify the distinct block and generate a P2P message (CLSIG) to notify every other node in
the network about the event. The (CLSIG) message cannot be generated unless enough members
comply with it. The message involves a valid signature for authenticity and verifiable by all the nodes
within the network. In this security protection technique, the transaction gets confirmed after the first
confirmation. Once confirmed, it cannot be reversed back as the signed block cannot be acknowledged
at a later time. This security feature lifts the six confirmation aspects and enhances a secure transaction
after just one confirmation. In addition to the 51% attack, ChainLocks also helps to mitigate other
security issues, such as selfish mining described in Section 5.
6.5. Merged Mining
Merged mining is a technique which allows multiple cryptocurrencies to be merged to mine at
the same time [51]. Low hashing cryptocurrencies that comprise the same consensus benefit from
merged mining. They can increase the hashing power by bootstrapping on the other currency that
comprises higher hashing power. Merged mining is not a security technique, but it is a method that,
when employed, can help to mitigate the 51% attack. Transactions in both networks work in sequence,
and the blockchains are classified as a parent and auxiliary blockchain. In addition to enhancing
security, another benefit is the ability that miners can mine more than a block simultaneously. This
technique builds up more security as the miner contributes to the entire hash rate of both currencies.
The Satoshi principle assumes that the blockchain network will always comprise a majority
number of honest nodes. However, the assumption turns out to be entirely wrong, as it is observed
that not only the mining pools but also the individual attackers are achieving about half of the network
hashing. The destructive nature of the 51% attack exploitation drew the attention of various research
groups to come up with advanced security protection techniques. Those security protection techniques
were introduced to defend against the 51% attack, and in the following section, we are analyzing their
effectiveness.
Appl. Sci. 2019, 9, 1788 13 of 17
7. Analysis
In this section, we analyze the effectiveness of five security protection techniques against the 51%
attack. Some of them are research prototype, and yet to be implemented on a real system. Figure 6
presents an evaluation framework, where we classify the risk elements of each security technique as
low, medium or high. The security-based framework also presents the advantage, vulnerability, cost,
and functionality of the mitigation techniques.
The penalty system for delayed block submission is a PoW-based security technique and yet to
be implemented in the real network. This technique is a research prototype and includes various
limitations. Based on the proposal, a block delay will be imposed over the privately mined chain.
Assuming an adversary aims to beat the six confirmation times, the introduced block delay will be
only 21 blocks. As a result, the attacker is forced to mine another 21 blocks in a sequence to lift the
delay and get his mined blocks to be included in the normal chain. According to Rosenfeld, in any
occasion, when an adversary owns 51% of the network hash, they will always succeed regardless of the
enforced delay [12]. Therefore, the possibility to perform the 51% attack when this security mechanism
is in place is very big, especially when targeting coins that have very low network hashing power.
In addition, the delay process slows the overall transactions of the network and intensely impacts the
regular transactions. Transactions that are added to the delay blocks will not be confirmed until the
penalty is lifted. Thus, it may take a few hours or even a few days to confirm some transactions. Hence,
this technique is not very appropriate to be implemented in a real network, it is not fully effective
against 51% attack, and it has a medium level risk.
The penalty makes the attack
much more costly to perform.
The delayed block approach
sets the attacker to mine a large
number of blocks in a sequence
before joining the legit chain. 
Risk Elements Vulnerability Identify  Cost
The introduced penalty  
may not be sufﬁcient to mitigate
the attack fully. Attackers
targeting low hashing coins
have a higher chance of
success. Hence, the risk level is
Medium.   
Identiﬁes the vulnerability
before the genuine chain
adopts it. 
This technique is a research
prototype. No implementation
cost is introduced.
Advantage
Penalty System 
DPoW
PirlGuard
ChainLocks
Merged Mining
Proof of Work (PoW) 
Functionality
Does not recognize the longest
chain rule. Notarization
provides extra defense. Flexible
and greater security
enhancement than Bitcoin
blockchain.
An attacker with 51% hashing
can execute the 51% attack
within the 10-minute notarized
period. However,  extensive
security makes the risk level
Low.
Does not identify the
vulnerability ahead. Coins with
few seconds of conﬁrmation
time can be at risk.
Practically implemented on
about 20 Blockchains. A cost is
introduced to execute this
security technique. 
Any UTXO based Blockchain
Follows a similar approach as
Penalty System and dPoW.
Therefore, introduces a penalty
to adversaries. 
Notarization involves master
nodes. The master nodes
intensify it as a centralized
technique. However, the overall
security policy makes the risk
level Low.  
Identiﬁes the vulnerability
ahead as soon as it is
recognized.  
Practical implementation. May
incur a fee.   Ethash Algorithm
Transactions are conﬁrmed
after a single block
conﬁrmation, making the
process very fast. 
 1 block conﬁrmation may lead
to double-spending with just
minimal hashing, such as 1
conﬁrmation attack. Hence, the
risk level is High.
 Locks-in the very ﬁrst block as
a genuine block by discarding
any other blocks or chain of
blocks.
ChainLocks is released to
'testnet'. It does require an
implementation cost.
Dash
Merges the hashing power of 2
crypto-coins, making the attack
more costly. The low reputed
coins can beneﬁt immensely
from this process. 
It is not a security policy;
hence,  an attacker  in
possession of the required
hashing can carry out a  51%
attack. Therefore, the risk level
is High. 
No security policy in place to
identify the vulnerability in
advance. 
Practically implemented. 
Does not require a cost for
implementation.
Auxiliary Proof of Work (PoW)
Figure 6. A security-based framework of defense mechanisms based on the 51% attack.
Komodo blockchain appoints notary nodes for notarization. The nodes are appointed to
retrieve the information from Komodo and save it in the bitcoin blockchain. In order to carry out
double-spending, an attacker needs to rewrite the Komodo chain and bitcoin checkpoints. The attacker
also needs to influence the majority of the notary network [52]. Hence, the whole process makes the
technique quite robust. However, a limited number of nodes makes this security technique centralized,
which introduces the widely known issue of a “single point of failure”, where attackers know exactly
what to attack. The dPoW is not cost-effective as it requires an implementation fee to be implemented
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to the blockchain. It can only be implemented to coins that are based on UTXO-based blockchain.
Moreover, participants are required to wait for an explicit amount of time for the notarization process
to be completed. It may discourage particular participants who aim to have a faster transaction. The
notarization process is done every 10 min. This 10 min checkpoint time gives attackers a vast amount
of time to conduct the 51% attack on crypto-coins in which the block confirmation time needs just a
few seconds [52]. The attack risk of this security technique is low.
PirlGuard was developed to provide protection against 51% exploitation. This security technique
is based on only the Ethash algorithm. It follows a similar approach to the “The Penalty System for
Delayed Block Submission”, which introduces a block delay. As discussed, the penalty system is
vulnerable to the 51% attack; therefore, it is relatively easy for an attacker to achieve the required blocks.
PrilGuard also involves master nodes for notarization, a centralized feature that makes the network
weak because of the “single point of failure” security issue. PilGuard establishes that it mitigates the
51% attack to approximately 0.03%. Therefore, both the penalty system and master node feature have
a low risk level.
ChainLocks also aims to provide protection against the 51% attack. The major limitation of
ChainLocks is that it only protects one currency. Dash, having only 4100 master nodes, can be a prime
target of a 51% attack due to the low hashing power [53]. It is very likely to conduct the 51% attack on
low hashing currencies by simply renting the required hashing power [54]. Hence, the security features
provided by ChainLocks are not robust enough to prevent the double-spending attack. Since only one
confirmation is required to publish a block, attackers with much less than 51% of the hashing power
can perform the double-spending attack, resulting in a more vulnerable Dash blockchain. Therefore,
the risk level is classified as high.
Merged mining is a way to protect low reputed coins by making them more robust against the
51% attack. Merged mining is not a security technique itself, but due to the process of allowing two
different cryptocurrencies based on the same algorithm to be mined simultaneously, it helps to mitigate
the 51% attack. However, the process is quite complicated and often neglected by miners. The major
limitation of this process is that the merged crypto-coins must be on the same consensus. Another
drawback is that if two low hashing crypto-coins are merged, then they can still be exploited as long
as the attacker achieves the required hashing power. Therefore, merged mining is just a process to
increase the attacking cost by merging hashing power, and it does not provide an effective solution.
We classify the risk level as high.
The longest chain rule is a key part of the protocol, but at the same time, it makes the blockchain
vulnerable to the 51% attack and other variants. In an effort to mitigate those attacks, security
techniques implementing specific policies were developed. Unfortunately, those policies contain
weaknesses and fail to provide full protection.
As we discussed in Section 3.1, the longest chain feature is key in the blockchain protocol but
without proper protection can be abused by attackers. We believe that in order to provide a secure
protocol, the security policy must accept only a certain number of continuous blocks, regardless of the
block generation time. This will mitigate 51% attack exploitation by preventing attackers from sending
a free number of new blocks in a short period. Therefore, future security policies must discard blocks
that violate an agreed threshold. Although the policy should be independent from cryptocurrencies,
the threshold must be tuned to a particular one based on the total hashing power.
8. Conclusions
The assumption of having the majority of honest miners over the blockchain network has been
underestimated resulting in realistic and practical 51% attacks to various cryptocoins. In fact, this
encouraged attackers to perform the 51% attack. We have shown that the PoW consensus protocol
comprises severe security risks and fails to protect against the 51% attack, uncovering that this and
other consensus protocols are vulnerable.
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We have also identified that the weaknesses which enable the 51% attack exploitation rely on
the hashing power ability of mining pools and how this attack could cause immense damage to the
blockchain network.
The presented security-based evaluation revealed the weaknesses of each technique by
categorizing them in a three-tier risk level. In our analysis, we showed that all the security techniques
fail to provide enough protection against the 51% attack. The implemented security policies lack
robustness, and a sturdy policy must be in place to overcome the issue.
By studying the limitations of the consensus protocols and the protection techniques, we revealed
the main weaknesses contained in them, suggesting that further research must be performed. A security
policy accepting a limited number of blocks by totally ignoring the longest chain rule must be explored
to mitigate the 51% attack effectively. For future work, we aim to develop an effective protection
mechanism against the 51% attack by creating a robust consensus protocol without the weaknesses
and limitations analyzed in this paper.
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